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THE LAW OF CONTRIBUTION – AN 
EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OR PART OF 
THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT? 
Victoria Stace* 
This article looks at the changes made to the equitable doctrine of contribution by the New Zealand 
Supreme Court in a 2016 decision, Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd. The approach 
now favoured by the Supreme Court is that to establish a claim for contribution by one defendant 
against another, there is no need to find any greater degree of coordination between the liabilities 
other than that the plaintiff could pursue either defendant for its loss and either would be liable for 
it, in whole or in part. The underlying rationale is that by paying the plaintiff, the defendant who was 
pursued not only discharges itself but also discharges the other defendant's liability. If mutual 
discharge is established, the court then determines the amount of contribution based on what is just 
and reasonable in the circumstances. The Supreme Court's approach to the doctrine of equitable 
contribution, which is a significant change to previous law, bears similarities to the approach 
proposed in the leading text on unjust enrichment, raising the issue of whether a future claim for 
contribution could be approached using an unjust enrichment analysis. 
I INTRODUCTION 
A practitioner facing an issue of contribution involving her client might well be excused for being 
confused. Looking for guidance, she might reach for two leading practitioners' texts. One is Meagher, 
Gummow and Lehane's Equity Doctrines and Remedies.1 The other is Goff & Jones: The Law of 
Unjust Enrichment.2 Both are recent publications (the latest editions being 2015 and 2016 
respectively). Both contain chapters describing the law on contribution. Equity Doctrines and 
Remedies describes contribution as an equitable doctrine. There is a long line of cases that confirms 
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this categorisation.3 The other text claims contribution is part of the law of unjust enrichment.4 The 
authors of Goff & Jones are not alone in claiming that the law of contribution is part of the law of 
unjust enrichment. This view is supported by Virgo in the United Kingdom,5 and Edelman and Bant 
in Australia.6 The solicitor might wonder whether the equitable doctrine of contribution has somehow 
jumped ship and landed in a different branch of the law. Or is the profession witnessing the birth of a 
new form of action, in unjust enrichment, which gives one defendant the ability to claim contribution 
from another if the elements of enrichment, at the expense of the claimant, which is unjust, are 
satisfied?  
This article considers these questions in light of recent decisions in New Zealand and Australia, 
and by reference to the related law of subrogation. It examines whether the law of contribution today 
is an equitable doctrine, governed by equitable rules developed by the courts, or is part of the law of 
unjust enrichment, or potentially both.  
The courts in New Zealand have not been asked to consider whether it might be appropriate to 
apply an unjust enrichment analysis to a contribution claim. The Supreme Court in a recent decision, 
Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, approached the claim as if it was a claim in equity.7 
This suggests that contribution is still considered by the New Zealand courts as an equitable doctrine, 
attracting an equity analysis. However, it may now be possible, in light of the changes made to the 
equitable doctrine by the Court in Hotchin, to apply an unjust enrichment analysis to resolve future 
claims. The approach taken in Hotchin opens the door to that possibility. 
This article suggests that the enthusiasm shown by the Supreme Court to adopt a more 
straightforward approach to the doctrine of equitable contribution is to be welcomed. The approach 
now supported by the Supreme Court can be expressed as follows: a right to claim contribution arises 
where the plaintiff could pursue either the person who is claiming contribution (the claimant) or the 
person against whom contribution is being claimed (the defendant) for its loss and either would be 
liable in whole or in part for it. This in turn is based on the underlying rationale that payment by the 
claimant to the plaintiff discharges the liability of the defendant (in whole or in part), and similarly 
payment by the defendant to the plaintiff would discharge the liability of the claimant (in whole or in 
part). If that test is satisfied, a right to claim contribution arises and the court will then assess the 
amount of contribution that is appropriate. At that stage, the court assesses relative culpability and 
causal significance. This is a significant departure from the approach to equitable contribution claims 
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taken in Australia where the courts require that for a claim in equitable contribution to succeed, the 
claimant's and defendant's actions must meet a test of equal or comparable culpability and equal or 
comparable causative effect. 
There are similarities between the approach now adopted by the New Zealand Supreme Court and 
the unjust enrichment analysis. Relevantly, an unjust enrichment approach has been taken in England 
in recent decisions involving claims for subrogation. Subrogation is the appropriate claim if the 
defendant's liability has not been discharged but the plaintiff is forbidden to recover from both (the 
classic situation being where an indemnity insurer has paid out on an insurance claim and then issues 
proceedings in the name of the insured against the defendant). A recent New Zealand decision has 
shown support for the English approach to subrogation, and in light of the Hotchin decision it would 
be conceivable that a New Zealand court might apply an unjust enrichment analysis to the next claim 
for contribution that comes before it.  
One might argue that the underlying rationale for the equitable doctrine, natural justice, requires 
a fundamentally different inquiry to that which is conducted under an unjust enrichment analysis, 
suggesting that the better approach is to continue to treat the law of contribution as an equitable 
doctrine. However, a comparison between the approach that has been adopted in Hotchin and that 
proposed in Goff & Jones suggests that the approaches are sufficiently similar that it would be a small 
step to recognise that contribution can be regarded as part of the law of unjust enrichment. The 
Hotchin decision has left us with an equitable doctrine under which, once the threshold test of mutual 
discharge is satisfied, the court has a broad discretion to determine the amount of contribution to 
award. The Goff & Jones approach similarly takes "equitable" considerations into account at the 
apportionment of responsibility stage. 
II  THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTION 
Contribution was historically available both at common law and in equity.8 Both common law 
and equity gave a person the right to obtain contribution to a payment made by that person in 
discharging a common obligation. The equitable action had several procedural and substantive 
advantages over the common law action.  McHugh J stated in 2002 that, "equitable principles now 
cover the field. Those principles are based on the equitable doctrine of equality."9 The basis of the 
action is generally seen as natural justice.10 In the classic 1920 text, Commentaries on Equity 
Jurisprudence, the basis of the equitable doctrine was explained as follows:11   
  
8  Heydon, Leeming and Turner, above n 1, at [10-020]–[10-030]. 
9  Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 17, (2002) 209 CLR 282 at [38] (footnotes omitted). 
10  Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1969) 121 CLR 342 at 350–351. 
11  AE Randall (ed) Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1920) at §493.    
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The claim … has its foundation in the clearest principles of natural justice; for, as all are equally bound 
and are equally relieved, it seems but just that in such a case all should contribute in proportion towards a 
benefit obtained by all …  
The cases establish that there must be a degree of coordination between the liabilities for a claim 
for contribution to succeed. As stated by the Australian High Court in 1969 in the landmark case of 
Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office:12  
… persons who are under co-ordinate liabilities to make good the one loss (e.g. sureties liable to make 
good a failure to pay the one debt) must share the burden pro rata. 
However, what is actually required by way of coordination is not easy to define.  
The list of coordinate liabilities attracting contribution is not closed.13 The liabilities can have 
different sources, for example contract, statute and tort and still be coordinate.14 Equity did not 
recognise a right of contribution between tortfeasors and this led to the enactment of statutory rights 
of contribution in many jurisdictions, for example s 17 of the Law Reform Act 1936 (NZ) and s 5 of 
the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW). All of these statutes were modelled on 
the Law Reform (Married Women Tortfeasors) Act 1935 (UK).15 
III  THE "SAME NATURE AND EXTENT" TEST 
The test commonly applied in recent decisions (prior to Hotchin) in both New Zealand and 
Australia to assess whether liabilities are coordinate, meaning that a right to contribution in equity 
arises, is whether they are of the same nature and to the same extent. This test is sourced from BP 
Petroleum Developments Ltd v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd16 and was applied in Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd17 
and Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd.18 
What is meant by "of the same nature and to the same extent" has not been clearly established by 
the cases. Some (in particular the Australian) cases refer to a requirement for comparable culpability 
  
12  Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW), above n 10, at 350. See also Burke v LFOT 
Pty Ltd, above n 9, at [90]–[91] and [99] per Kirby J; and Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint 
Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012] 2 NZLR 726 at [129] per Tipping J. 
13  Heydon, Leeming and Turner, above n 1, at [10-050]; and Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd, above n 9, at [49] per 
McHugh J, [91]–[92] and [101] per Kirby J. 
14  BP Petroleum Developments Ltd v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd 1987 SLT 345 (OH) at 348. 
15  Some Australian states have statutes that provide a right to claim contribution for all wrongs (as is the case 
now in the United Kingdom under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (UK)). 
16  BP Petroleum Developments Ltd v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd, above n 14. 
17  Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd, above n 9. 
18  Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 12. 
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and comparable causation.19 Comments made by Lord Ross in BP Petroleum suggest the rationale 
behind this requirement is that if one wrongdoer is primarily liable, then contribution is not the 
appropriate remedy (and instead the claim should be for subrogation).20 It is also related to the fact 
that the equitable doctrine traditionally resulted in an equal contribution by claimant and defendant.21 
However, the New Zealand Supreme Court has, in Hotchin, moved away from an approach that denies 
contribution where the actions of the wrongdoers cannot be regarded as of an equivalent level. The 
"same nature and extent test" was rejected by the majority in Hotchin, as was the need for equal 
apportionment. A similar approach was taken by Kirby J in Burke, who in the course of his dissenting 
decision said:22  
Given the purpose and character of contribution as an equitable remedy, I am unconvinced that, as a matter 
of principle, rateable apportionment in differing amounts is alien to the notion of contribution. 
It can be argued that the founding principle of "natural justice" does not inherently require 
comparable levels of culpability and causation, and this was the view taken by Elias CJ in Hotchin, 
who said, "[c]ontribution is an equitable remedy to right what would otherwise be an injustice, but 
only to that extent."23 In addition, such a requirement is problematic because judges can have differing 
views on relative levels of culpability and causative effect, as illustrated by the Burke decision.  
In Burke, H Ltd was a purchaser of land. LFOT was the seller of the land. B was the solicitor for 
the purchaser, advising on the transaction. In essence, LFOT told H Ltd there was a high quality tenant 
in residence in one of the commercial units on the land. This was not true and was in breach of the 
Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) prohibition on false and misleading conduct. H Ltd brought 
a claim under that Act and succeeded in obtaining an order for damages against LFOT. LFOT then 
claimed that B should be required to make a contribution to LFOT, as B had been negligent and that 
had contributed to H Ltd's loss. B had failed to make the enquiries that a reasonable solicitor would 
have made in these circumstances and which would have revealed that the tenant in question was not 
a high quality tenant. 
Four out of five of the judges in the High Court allowed B's appeal, which in effect denied LFOT 
any right of contribution. Three different sets of reasoning were given in the majority decisions. All 
of the majority judges applied the traditional test for assessing whether a claim for equitable 
contribution will arise, namely, the liabilities of the co-obligors must be "of the same nature and to 
  
19  Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd, above n 9, at [16]–[20]; AMP Bank Ltd v Brown [2017] NSWSC 313; and 
Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 12, at [219]–[221]. 
20  BP Petroleum Developments Ltd v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd, above n 14, at 348–349.  
21  See authorities referred to below at n 64. 
22  Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd, above n 9, at [119]. 
23  Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, above n 7, at [157]. 
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the same extent".24 This included notions of equal or comparable culpability and equal or comparable 
causal significance.25 
According to Gaudron and Hayne JJ, there was:26 
… much to be said for the view that the culpability of LFOT … and the causal significance of their conduct 
to the loss suffered by Hanave was of such a different order from that of Mr Burke that they should not 
be entitled to contribution. 
In addition, if LFOT was allowed to claim a contribution, it would not have paid its "proper share" 
because it would then receive an amount in excess of the true value of the premises.27 
However, Kirby J took the view that the wrongdoers were equally culpable. In Kirby J 's view, H 
Ltd could have sued either LFOT or B for the same loss. It should not matter who the plaintiff chooses 
to proceed against. There was a common burden; full liability could have been recovered from each. 
Substantial justice required that contribution be allowed.28  
In Altimarloch, only McGrath J focused specifically on the need to find comparable levels of 
culpability and causation, finding there were comparable levels in this case.29 However the majority 
judges all had their own reasons for disagreeing with the result reached by McGrath J, illustrating 
how differing interpretations can be made of what is meant by liabilities being "of the same nature 
and to the same extent".  
For example, Tipping J found that liability for the failure to perform a term of the contract was 
different from making a negligent misstatement and different duties underlay each of those 
obligations.30 The losses were also different. Blanchard J found there was no "common liability" 
between the two obligors because the amount the vendor had to pay was measured on a performance 
basis. The only loss for which the Council was liable was the diminution in value.31 He also stated 
  
24  Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd, above n 9, at [15], [38] and [49]. 
25  At [16]. 
26  At [19]. 
27  At [22]. 
28  At [115].  
29  Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 12, at [219], [227] and [231]. 
30  At [146]. 
31  At [75]. 
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that a tortfeasor could not be liable to contribute to a loss of a character for which it can have no 
liability to the plaintiff.32  
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, AMP Bank Ltd v Brown, confirmed 
in the context of a claim for contribution between co-sureties, that liability for coordinate obligations 
cannot be apportioned other than equally.33 The Court stated that the doctrine of contribution is 
founded in equity on the ground of equality of burden, and that a right to contribution only arises "if 
the parties' liabilities are coordinate, meaning 'of the same nature and to the same extent'" and that 
"equal exposure to coordinate liabilities demands equal contribution".34 The law recognises, said the 
Court, only a few limited exceptions, for example where one surety is guilty of fraud or gross 
negligence.35 The law in New Zealand and that in Australia appears therefore to have diverged as a 
result of the Hotchin decision, at least where the liabilities have different sources.  
IV  THE NEW ZEALAND SUPREME COURT ADOPTS A 
DIFFERENT APPROACH 
In Hotchin, Elias CJ rejected the "same nature and extent" test when assessing if the liabilities of 
the claimant and defendant were sufficiently coordinate meaning that a claim for contribution would 
be available.36 The goal of achieving substantive justice did not in her view require comparable levels 
of culpability or causative effect. Questions of relative culpability and causal significance could be 
reflected, she said, in the eventual orders made.37   
The New Zealand Supreme Court decision in Hotchin has significantly altered the law on 
contribution as it applies in New Zealand. The law has been altered in three important respects. First, 
the Court rejected the need to find any greater degree of coordination between the liabilities other 
than the plaintiff could pursue either the claimant or the defendant and either would be liable.38 As 
explained below, this encompasses a requirement for mutual discharge of liability. Secondly, the 
claimant and defendant do not need to both be liable for the full amount of the plaintiff's loss. It is 
  
32  At [75]. He was also influenced by the fact that if the vendor succeeded, that would result in the vendor getting 
an overpayment and receiving more than the land was worth: at [76]. 
33  AMP Bank Ltd v Brown, above n 19. 
34  At [38]. 
35  At [40]. 
36  Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, above n 7, at [152]. 
37  At [158]. 
38  At [150]–[152]. 
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enough if there is an overlap in liability.39 Thirdly, the court can award variable contribution. It is not 
limited to allocating the (overlapping) liability equally or proportionately.40 
In Hotchin, the financial markets conduct regulator in New Zealand brought an action against the 
directors of a collapsed finance company, alleging misleading statements in a prospectus. The 
directors settled the claim on payment of several million dollars. One of them then sought contribution 
from the trustee that had supervised the issue. 
The director argued that he had a claim for contribution against the trustee either under s 17 of the 
Law Reform Act (on the basis both were tortfeasors) or under the equitable doctrine of contribution 
(on the basis that his liability was statutory). The director had effectively admitted responsibility for 
the misleading prospectus because, while he was party to public statements made at the time of the 
settlement that denied liability, in order to make the claim for contribution under the Law Reform Act 
the director accepted he would have to establish that he was indeed liable in tort to the investors.41 
Both the claim under the Law Reform Act and the claim in equity were dismissed by the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal.42 On appeal, both claims were allowed, by a majority of three to two, 
by the Supreme Court.  
The Chief Justice gave the majority's decision on this issue, with Glazebrook and William Young 
JJ agreeing with her, subject to one reservation expressed by Glazebrook J.43 The Court suggested 
that the test for whether a right of contribution arises under the Law Reform Act (which requires that 
both defendants be liable for the same damage) and whether a right to claim contribution arises under 
the equitable doctrine, is the same. It took an in-substance approach to the issue of whether the damage 
was the same. A right to claim contribution would arise if it could be said that "responsibility for the 
harm is shared. This is an inquiry that is practical and directed at the substance of the matter in the 
particular case."44  
The Chief Justice drew support from the minority judgments in each of the earlier cases of Burke 
and Altimarloch. In particular, she was drawn to the reasoning of Kirby J in Burke, which she said 
  
39  At [152]. 
40  At [157]. 
41  At [36]. 
42  See Financial Markets Authority v Hotchin [2013] NZHC 1611, [2014] 3 NZLR 655; and Hotchin v The New 
Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd [2014] NZCA 400, [2014] 3 NZLR 685.  
43  Glazebrook J suggested, at [90] and n 93, that while mutual discharge is a requirement for contribution it does 
not necessarily encompass the whole test: Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, above n 7. 
44  At [152]. 
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had also been attractive to McGrath J (who gave the minority decision in Altimarloch).  The test for 
coordinate liabilities which Kirby J accepted as giving rise to contribution is whether:45 
… the liabilities of the co-obligors to the principal claimant are such that enforcement by [the claimant] 
against either co-obligor would diminish that obligor in his material substance to the value of the liability. 
In Hotchin, her Honour said:46  
The approach I favour accords with that taken by Kirby J in Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd for reasons which 
seem to me to be compelling and which it would be superfluous to repeat. 
…  
The simpler approach expressed by Kirby J reduces the capacity for confusion through over-refinement 
of terms by making it clear that the jurisdiction arises where two parties are liable in respect of the same 
damage.  It has the merit of ensuring that contribution under s 17(1)(c) [of the Law Reform Act] and at 
common law continues on the same principles from which s 17(1)(c) was derived and achieves practical 
justice. 
V  THE TEST ADOPTED IN HOTCHIN REQUIRES MUTUAL 
DISCHARGE 
Kirby J had explained that the idea behind the test he adopted is that equity intervenes:47 
… to recognise the availability of legal remedies against both of the propounded co-obligors, hence the 
coordinate liabilities, and thus the obligation of each of Mr Burke and the respondents together to 
contribute to Hanave's damages …   
However, it is not enough that the plaintiff can pursue two defendants, because the plaintiff could 
have two independent causes of action. His Honour then said:48  
By discharging their respective obligations to pay Hanave's damages, the respondents [LOFT] not only 
discharge themselves but they also discharge Mr Burke's liability which otherwise, as a matter of law, 
could have been enforced against him by Hanave.  
In other words, according to Kirby J, what is required to be established in order to demonstrate 
that the liabilities are coordinate, is that the plaintiff could pursue either obligor for its loss, and either 
would be liable for it, and that payment by either one would discharge the liability of the other. It 
would seem that the Supreme Court of New Zealand has now adopted that approach as the law in 
  
45  Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd, above n 9, at [103]. 
46  Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, above n 7, at [150] and [158] (footnotes omitted). 
47  Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd, above n 9, at [104]. 
48  At [105] (footnotes omitted). 
480 (2017) 48 VUWLR 
New Zealand. That mutual discharge is required is implicit in Elias CJ's statement that "it is unjust 
for the burden of meeting a loss for which others share responsibility to be borne by one party, to the 
benefit of those who escape liability".49 
The approach favoured by Kirby J (and now by the New Zealand Supreme Court) is very similar 
to that which has been adopted in several English cases to determine if a right to contribution arises 
under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (UK), and which is known as the "mutual discharge" 
test.50 Under this test, a right to contribution arises if payment by either the claimant or the defendant 
to the plaintiff would relieve the other of liability. This test was adopted in Howkins & Harrison v 
Tyler51 and subsequently applied in Eastgate Group Ltd v Lindsey Morden Group Inc52 and 
Hurstwood Developments Ltd v Motor & General & Andersley & Co Insurance Services Ltd.53  
In Howkins, a building society advanced money to a company. The debt was guaranteed by Tyler. 
The money was advanced in reliance on a valuation given to the building society by Howkins. The 
company defaulted. The guarantee was called on but no payment made. The property was sold and 
there was still £500,000 owing. The building society commenced proceedings against the valuer 
(Howkins) in negligence. Those proceedings were settled on payment of £400,000. Howkins then 
claimed contribution from Tyler. The claim was made under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 
(UK), which requires that both obligors be liable in respect of the "same damage". The English Court 
of Appeal found that the "same damage" requirement was not met. 
Scott VC considered that the test broke down into two components. First, the parties must have 
been liable to a third party who is forbidden to accumulate recoveries. Secondly, the third party's 
rights must have been extinguished when paid by the claimant, and if the defendant had paid instead, 
it would have been possible to say that the claimant's liability would have been discharged. In 
Howkins, receipt of £400,000 from the valuer did not reduce the debt owing by the guarantor. 
The mutual discharge test was subsequently rejected by the House of Lords in Royal Brompton 
Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond as being a threshold question, on the basis that questions of 
  
49  Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, above n 7, at [152]. Other statements in Hotchin that support 
the requirement of mutual discharge are made at [90] per Glazebrook J, [171] and [206] per William Young 
J. 
50  The Civil Liability (Contribution) Act (UK) allows contribution to be claimed by any person liable in respect 
of damage, from another person liable in respect of the same damage. Its application is therefore wider than 
the Law Reform Act 1936 (NZ) which only applies to tortfeasors. 
51  Howkins & Harrison v Tyler [2001] Lloyd's Rep PN 1 (CA) at [17].  
52  Eastgate Group Ltd v Lindsey Morden Group Inc [2001] EWCA Civ 1446, [2002] 1 WLR 642.  
53  Hurstwood Developments Ltd v Motor & General & Andersley & Co Insurance Services Ltd [2001] EWCA 
Civ 1785.   
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contribution would become unnecessarily complex.54 Royal Brompton involved a tripartite building 
contract between an employer, a contractor and an architect. The employer engaged the contractor as 
the main contractor for the construction of a new hospital. The architect had responsibility for a variety 
of tasks including monitoring the construction and deciding on requests for extension of time. If the 
construction was not completed by a certain date the contractor had to pay the employer liquidated 
and ascertained damages of a certain amount per week. The contractor made numerous applications 
for extension of time and for corresponding payment of loss and expenses for prolongation and 
disruption. The architect granted several extensions, meaning the construction was completed late. 
The contractor was relieved of any liability to pay liquidated and ascertained damages for the delay, 
due to the architect's extensions. The contractor also claimed and was paid an additional amount for 
prolongation and disruption. 
In arbitration proceedings commenced by the contractor, a further amount for prolongation and 
disruption was claimed against the employer and the employer counterclaimed. The employer and 
contractor settled their dispute. The employer agreed to indemnify the contractor against any claim 
for contribution made against the contractor by the architect. The employer then claimed against the 
architect alleging it had been negligent on several grounds, including granting extensions of time. The 
architect claimed a contribution against the contractor in relation to that negligence claim, arguing 
that the contractor was liable to contribute to any amount the architect had to pay to the employer. 
The claim was made under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act (UK), which requires that the 
architect and the contractor were liable in respect of the "same damage". The House of Lords found 
that the damage in this case was not the same.55 
The House of Lords referred to Eastgate Group as an illustration of its concern that adoption of 
the mutual discharge test would lead to unnecessary complexity. The "complexity" in Eastgate Group 
was that contribution will not be awarded if one of the claims is for repayment of a debt as opposed 
to a claim for damages. Longmore LJ in the English Court of Appeal found that when damages fall 
to be assessed against a negligent valuer, the value of the buyer's covenant to repay must be brought 
into account to reduce the claim against the valuer, meaning a contribution claim would not succeed 
(this was what happened in Howkins). But it did not follow that the same approach was correct for 
cases not of a borrower's covenant to repay his loan but of breach of contract, in other words a claim 
for damages.56 Accordingly, the claim for contribution was allowed. 
  
54  Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond [2002] UKHL 14, [2002] 1 WLR 1397 at [28]. 
55  At [7] and [30]. 
56  Eastgate Group Ltd v Lindsey Morden Group Inc, above n 52, at [14]: "This is due to the essential difference 
between a claim for repayment of a debt (to which there can ordinarily be no substantive defence and in 
respect of which a claimant does not have to prove loss) and a claim for damages for breach of contract (to 
which there may be many defences and in respect of which the claimant must prove his loss)."  
482 (2017) 48 VUWLR 
Another "complexity" that can arise in assessing mutual discharge is illustrated by the Altimarloch 
decision. If the claims are sequential, so that the loss resulting from the actions of one wrongdoer is 
calculated after taking into account any amount recovered from the other wrongdoer, a claim for 
contribution will not succeed. In Altimarloch, the view adopted by the Chief Justice was that the 
damage claimed against the Council was dependent on the net position reached on the liability of the 
vendors for breach of contract. Similarly, if the liabilities are distinct, a claim for contribution will not 
succeed. An example of distinct liabilities is Royal Brompton, where the architects were liable not in 
respect of the harm caused to the owner by the builder's delay in construction but for the distinct and 
consequential harm of compromising the owner's claim against the builder for delay. 
These decisions illustrate that an assessment of whether payment by one defendant discharges the 
liability of another can raise complex issues of law. However, while complex issues of law are likely 
to arise, it is suggested that this is a preferable approach to the "same nature and extent" test. There is 
uncertainty about what "same nature and extent" requires, and if the court resorts to a test that requires 
comparable levels of culpability and causation then the threshold question of whether to allow a claim 
for contribution to proceed can turn on the view taken by individual judges of those matters. 
VI  THE NEW APPROACH ALLOWS CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS 
TO ATTACH TO THE OVERLAP IN LIABILITY 
Not only did the Chief Justice in Hotchin adopt Kirby J's test for assessment of whether a claim 
for contribution arises. She went further and rejected the need for both the claimant and defendant to 
be fully liable for the plaintiff's loss. It is suggested that Kirby J contemplated that both would be fully 
liable for the plaintiff's loss. This was the situation in Burke and also in the context from which the 
test was sourced (the third edition of Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's Equity Doctrines and 
Remedies).57 In Hotchin the Chief Justice indicated her support for the test for contribution to be met 
where each obligor is wholly or partially liable for the claimant's loss. The Chief Justice said "[t]he 
obligations need not be identical in their … extent."58  
There is precedent for this approach in the context of a contribution claim made under statute. In 
Nationwide Building Society v Dunlop Haywards (DHL) Ltd, which involved a claim under the Civil 
Liability (Contribution) Act (UK), the plaintiff building society had claims against both the valuers, 
  
57  RP Meagher, WMC Gummow and JRF Lehane Equity: Doctrines & Remedies (3rd ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 
1992) acknowledges one situation where the obligors might be liable in differing amounts and contribution 
would be available, that is where each is liable for the whole of the obligation but with a limitation on the 
quantum recoverable: at [1017]. See also [10.090] and [10.125] of the fifth edition of this text: Heydon, 
Leeming and Turner, above n 1. 
58  Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, above n 7, at [152]. See also [142] and [153] where her 
Honour expressed the view that the law is the same whether the claim is brought under the Law Reform Act 
or in equity. 
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who had fraudulently overvalued certain properties, and against the solicitors in negligence.59 The 
solicitors settled the claim then claimed contribution from the valuers. The solicitors' liability in 
negligence was significantly less than the valuers' liability in deceit. The Court held that any category 
of loss for which only one of the obligors was liable should be ignored when identifying what was the 
"same damage". Clarke J said:60  
I see no reason why the court cannot distinguish between one category of economic loss for which DHL 
[the valuers] was responsible but Cobbetts [the solicitors] were not, viz loss not reasonably foreseeable 
which is only recoverable because DHL was fraudulent, and the foreseeable loss for which both were 
liable. 
VII  THE NEW APPROACH ALLOWS FOR VARIABLE AMOUNTS 
OF CONTRIBUTION TO BE AWARDED 
The approach adopted by the majority in Hotchin is a two-stage test, as explained above. If Kirby 
J's test for coordinate liabilities is satisfied, the court moves onto the next stage, which is to assess 
what amount of contribution is just and reasonable in the circumstances. In Hotchin, the Chief Justice 
indicated that the court had a broad equitable discretion to determine the amount of contribution 
awarded.61 Only at the second stage, namely when assessing whether it is just and reasonable that 
contribution be awarded and the amount of the award, would the court consider matters of culpability 
and causation.62 Contribution would only be ordered if and to the extent necessary to right what would 
otherwise be an injustice.63 At the second stage of the test proposed by the Chief Justice in Hotchin 
the court makes an assessment of whether the party who is claiming contribution has paid more than 
its "fair share" of the liability. Variable contribution is contemplated by the majority decision in 
Hotchin.  
This is a significant development in the law. Traditionally contribution has been awarded in equal 
shares or in some circumstances proportionately, for example if the obligors have by contract limited 
their obligation to meet the full loss. The authors of Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's Equity 
Doctrines & Remedies opine that under the equitable doctrine, liability can only be apportioned 
  
59  Nationwide Building Society v Dunlop Haywards (DHL) Ltd [2009] EWHC 254 (Comm), [2010] 1 WLR 258. 
60  At [47]. This approach is supported by Stephen Todd "Multiple Causes of Loss and Claims for Contribution" 
(2013) 25 NZULR 960; and Ben Prewett "Wrongdoers' Rights to Contribution in Mixed Liability Cases" 
[2012] NZ L Rev 643. Further support for the proposition that the liabilities need not be to the "same extent" 
can be found in the insurance cases, where the policies cover a common risk but are not co-extensive (as in 
Albion Insurance Co Ltd v GIO (NSW), above n 10). 
61  Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, above n 7, at [149] and [157]. See also at [90], [99] and [160]. 
62  At [157]–[158]. 
63  At [157]. Elias CJ also saw this approach as consistent with the scheme of s 17 of the Law Reform Act at 
[153]. 
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equally and cite a series of cases in support of that view.64 The authors of that text claim that this is a 
difference between the equitable doctrine and the statutory regimes. 
Kirby J expressed the view in Burke that equity allows the apportionment of liability, so that if 
for example there was unequal culpability, the court could apportion liability in a just and 
proportionate way.65 However, this finding was obiter on the facts of Burke, because he was of the 
view that the misrepresentations by LFOT and B's negligence were each effective (and equal) causes 
of the loss.66 In Hotchin, the Chief Justice indicated her support for the law to move in the direction 
preferred by Kirby J, saying "[c]ontribution is an equitable remedy to right what would otherwise be 
an injustice, but only to that extent."67  
VIII  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTRIBUTION AND THE LAW 
OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
The Supreme Court has indicated its support for the approach proposed by Kirby J in Burke that 
a right to contribution will arise if the plaintiff could pursue either the claimant or the defendant for 
its loss (in whole or in part) and either would be liable for it. As explained above, payment by the 
claimant must discharge the defendant's liability (in whole or in part), and similarly payment by the 
defendant (if pursued) would discharge the claimant's liability. If that test is satisfied the court will 
then exercise its discretion to assess the appropriate amount of contribution to award, based on what 
is just and reasonable in the circumstances. 
The changes to the law of contribution made by the Supreme Court in Hotchin mean that the 
approach now favoured by the Supreme Court in New Zealand has significant similarities to that 
proposed by the authors of Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment. 
  
64  Leigh-Mardon Pty Ltd v Wawn (1995) 17 ACSR 741 (NSWSC) at 752; Bialkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 83 
FCR 1 at 13; Hanave Pty Ltd v LFOT Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1568, (1999) 168 ALR 318 at [24]–[29]; and 
Glenmont Investments Pty Ltd v O'Loughin (No 3) (2001) 79 SASR 288 at [18]. See Heydon, Leeming and 
Turner, above n 1, at [10-090].  On the other hand, Charles Mitchell The Law of Contribution and 
Reimbursement (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) takes the view that unequal apportionment of 
liability is possible and cites cases that support that proposition at [10.01] and following.  
65  He acknowledged that the weight of authority was against unequal apportionments but said "[o]bservations 
favourable to this possibility have been made in Australian courts": Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd, above n 9, at 
[119]. 
66  At [122]. See also at [24] per McHugh J. 
67  Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, above n 7, at [157]. Consistency as between the statutory and 
common law regimes also supports this approach. 
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A  Overview of the Law of Unjust Enrichment 
There is general acceptance that the law of unjust enrichment at a minimum provides a:68 
… unifying legal concept which explains why the law recognises, in a variety of distinct categories of 
case, an obligation on the part of the defendant to make fair and just restitution for a benefit derived at the 
expense of a plaintiff and which assists in the determination, by the ordinary processes of legal reasoning, 
of the question whether the law should, in justice, recognize such an obligation in a new or developing 
category of case. 
In a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, Lampson (Australia) Pty Ltd v 
Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (No 3), Edelman J explained how unjust enrichment has been recognised 
in Australia as a way of grouping claims that share certain characteristics.69 The Court was faced with 
a claim for work done in anticipation of a contract that did not eventuate. The claim was brought in 
restitution for unjust enrichment. Edelman J said that "[i]n broad summary, a plea of money had and 
received is a plea in the 'taxonomic category' of unjust enrichment."70 He explained that unjust 
enrichment was in his view a broad categorisation applicable to a group of claims that all share similar 
characteristics, like the word "tort" describes claims brought in tort.71  
In New Zealand, the law of unjust enrichment has developed to the point where the courts have 
on occasion recognised a free standing cause of action in some circumstances. For example, in Lykov 
v Wei a claim was made by a purchaser of a leaky apartment against the previous owners, who had 
received a significant payment, after the sale, from a claim by the body corporate against the 
Council.72 Here, alternative claims were brought, one for breach of warranty under the sale and 
purchase agreement and the other on the basis of unjust enrichment. The High Court referred to the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Stiassny,73 and applied the 
principles of unjust enrichment to find that the claim against the vendors was made out (saying that 
the claim could be expressed alternatively as a claim in unjust enrichment or a claim for payment 
made to the vendors under a mistake).74  
  
68  Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul [1987] HCA 5, (1987) 162 CLR 221 at [14]. A similar approach to the law 
of unjust enrichment in Australia was taken in Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd [2009] HCA 44, (2009) 239 
CLR 269 at [88]–[89]; and in Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton [2012] HCA 7, (2012) 246 CLR 498 at [30].  
69  Lampson (Australia) Pty Ltd v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (No 3) [2014] WASC 162. 
70  At [45]. 
71  At [49]–[52]. 
72  Lykov v Wei [2015] NZHC 3009, [2016] NZAR 28. 
73  Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Stiassny [2012] NZCA 93, [2013] 1 NZLR 140 at [92]. Followed in Suisse 
International Ltd v Monk [2015] NZCA 46 at [32]. 
74  Lykov v Wei, above n 72, at [50]–[56].  
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On the other hand, in Torbay Holdings Ltd v Napier,75 the High Court said unjust enrichment is 
simply a term for the underpinning doctrine of law behind various restitutionary remedies. A similar 
approach was taken in Phil & Teds Most Excellent Buggy Co Ltd v Out 'n' About ATP Ltd, where 
Associate Judge Smith said:76  
The question of whether unjust enrichment is a free-standing cause of action is a developing area of the 
law, and accordingly one in which the Court must be cautious to exercise summary jurisdiction. 
It is suggested that the issue is not whether a claim for contribution should be described as a claim 
in unjust enrichment or a claim in equity. The issue is whether it is useful to approach a claim for 
contribution using an unjust enrichment analysis. No New Zealand case has yet approached a claim 
for contribution using an unjust enrichment analysis. However, given there is some recognition that a 
claim for contribution is based on provision of restitution for unjust enrichment, that suggests one 
should consider the possibility of approaching a contribution claim using an unjust enrichment 
analysis. There is such recognition in Burke,77 and also in the recent Australian case of Lavin v 
Toppi.78 The Court in Hotchin came close to recognising this as the basis of contribution in the 
following statement:79  
Contribution is an equitable principle which expresses natural justice in its recognition that it is unjust for 
the burden of meeting a loss for which others share responsibility to be borne by one party, to the benefit 
of those who escape liability. 
B  How the Commentators Locate Contribution within the Law of Unjust 
Enrichment 
As stated in the introduction to this article, the authors of Goff & Jones claim contribution is part 
of the law of unjust enrichment. They are supported in this view by Virgo in the Principles of 
Restitution, Edelman and Bant in Unjust Enrichment, and Mitchell in his earlier text, The Law of 
Contribution and Reimbursement.80 The claim is made on the basis that an analysis of the 
requirements of a contribution claim reveals that such a claim shares the conditions necessary for 
recovery that are held by other claims based on unjust enrichment. In summary these are: enrichment, 
  
75  Torbay Holdings Ltd v Napier [2015] NZHC 2477, [2015] NZAR 1839 at [164]. 
76  Phil & Teds Most Excellent Buggy Co Ltd v Out 'n' About ATP Ltd [2016] NZHC 71 at [144]. 
77  Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd, above n 9, at [38] per McHugh J: "An order of contribution prevents the injustice that 
would otherwise flow to the plaintiff by the defendant being enriched at the plaintiff's expense in 
circumstances where they have a common obligation to meet the liability which the plaintiff has met or will 
have to meet." 
78  Lavin v Toppi [2015] HCA 4, (2015) 254 CLR 459 at [41]. 
79  Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, above n 7, at [38]. 
80  Virgo, above n 5; Edelman and Bant, above n 6; and Mitchell, above n 64, at ch 3. 
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at the expense of the claimant, that is unjust. In brief, and this is explained further below, the defendant 
against whom a claim for contribution is made has been enriched by discharge in whole or in part of 
a liability to a third party. The person claiming contribution has borne the full burden of a liability 
that should be shared. What is the factor that makes the defendant's enrichment unjust is subject to 
debate amongst the different writers. 
The claim in Goff & Jones that contribution properly sits within the law of unjust enrichment is 
supported by reference to cases where it is stated that contribution has a restitutionary basis. The 
English, New Zealand and Australian courts have all acknowledged that claims for contribution are 
based on restitutionary principles.81 In Cockburn v GIO Finance Ltd (No 2), a decision of the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal, Mason J said:82  
The injustice prevented by an award of contribution or recoupment is the enrichment of the defendant at 
the expense of the plaintiff actually or imminently liable in part (contribution) or whole (recoupment) … 
On this basis, the concept of unjust enrichment has been seen as the underlying principle. 
In Dairy Containers Ltd v NZI Bank Ltd, Thomas J in the New Zealand High Court said: 
"Principles of equity and unjust enrichment have ensured that a party held liable for such wrongdoing 
can enforce a right of contribution against another non-tortious wrongdoer."83  
Recently the High Court of Australia was faced with a claim for contribution by one guarantor 
(the claimant) against another (the defendant). In Lavin, the claimant and defendant had jointly and 
severally guaranteed a loan to a company from a bank.84 The defendant and the bank entered into a 
deed of settlement and release on the defendant's payment to the bank of around one quarter of the 
total owing under the guarantee. The bank covenanted in the deed of settlement not to sue the 
defendant in respect of the guarantee. The claimant was then pursued by the bank for the remaining 
75 per cent and paid up, discharging the guarantee. The claimant then sought contribution from the 
defendant for one-half of the difference between the amounts paid (meaning each would end up 
paying half the liability). Finding that there was a right to claim contribution, the Court noted the 
importance of enrichment in a contribution claim, saying:85  
  
81  At 43–44. The English cases include Westdeutsche Landesbank Gironzentrale v Islington London Borough 
Council [1996] AC 669 (HL) at 727; and Berghoff Trading Ltd Swinbrook Developments Ltd [2009] EWCA 
Civ 413, [2009] 2 Lloyd's Rep 233 at [24].  
82  Cockburn & Ors v GIO Finance Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWCA 177 at [24]. Similar comments were made in 
James Hardie v Wyong Shire Council [2000] NSWCA 107 at [36]. 
83  Dairy Containers Ltd v NZI Bank Ltd [1995] 2 NZLR 30 at 123. 
84  Lavin v Toppi, above n 78. 
85  At [41]. 
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When a common liability is discharged by a surety, the discharge of the liability inevitably benefits a co-
surety in that, without a right of contribution in the surety, the co-surety who pays less than his or her fair 
share is unjustly enriched. 
There is, however, a significant difference between, on the one hand, recognising that one party 
has been "unjustly enriched" in a general sense and that such enrichment underlies at least in part the 
"natural justice" rationale for contribution, and, on the other, applying an unjust enrichment analysis 
to a contribution claim. The latter approach recognises that "unjust enrichment" is a distinct way of 
approaching a claim for relief, based on a defined set of principles.  
C  What is Required to be Established in Order to Make Out a Claim for 
Contribution Using an Unjust Enrichment Analysis? 
The authors of Goff & Jones propose a series of five criteria to be met in order to establish the 
conditions for a claim for contribution. If these criteria are satisfied then the basis for a claim for 
contribution exists, and accordingly there will be enrichment of the defendant, at the expense of the 
claimant. The "unjust" factor is discussed further below. The five criteria to be met are:86  
(1) payment by the claimant discharged the defendant's liability;  
(2) the claimant and the defendant were both liable to the plaintiff; 
(3) the plaintiff was forbidden to accumulate recoveries; 
(4) the plaintiff could recover in full from either; and 
(5) it is appropriate that some or all of the burden of liability should be borne by the defendant. 
What is useful about this approach is that it identifies the essential elements of a successful claim 
for contribution. It dispenses with the language of "coordinate liabilities" and also of the liabilities 
being of the same nature and extent. In other words, there is no need to find any greater degree of 
coordination between the liabilities beyond that which arises on satisfaction of the five criteria 
specified. This approach focuses on the fact that payment by the claimant discharged the defendant's 
liability, and couples that with a prohibition on accumulation of recoveries (although in practice the 
two inquiries are likely to overlap). It also allows for contribution to be awarded where there is an 
overlap in liabilities rather than requiring both claimant and defendant to be liable in full for the 
plaintiff's loss. 
It is suggested that the five criteria identified in the Goff & Jones approach are also required to be 
met for a successful claim under the equitable doctrine of contribution. If the payment by the claimant 
has not discharged the defendant's liability, there can be no claim for contribution, because there has 
been no common burden, no relief and natural justice does not call for a remedy. If both parties are 
not liable to the plaintiff, again there is no reason why natural justice requires a remedy in the form 
of contribution. If the claimant is not liable, there is no basis on which to claim contribution. If the 
defendant is not liable, then the claimant's payment has not benefitted the defendant in any way so 
  
86  Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson, above n 2, at [20.01]. 
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there is no reason in natural justice for the law to allow a claim in contribution. Equity requires a 
remedy on the basis of natural justice where there is a common burden. The law of unjust enrichment 
reaches the same conclusion but is arguably more disciplined in the sense that all that must be shown 
is that there is enrichment, at the claimant's expense, and that there is a recognised unjust factor that 
makes the retention of the enrichment unjust.  
If the plaintiff is permitted to accumulate recoveries (in other words, recover from both obligors), 
then again natural justice does not require that the claimant be permitted to claim contribution. The 
plaintiff can recover from the claimant and then pursue the defendant. But it is not as simple as stating 
that if the claimant's payment discharged the defendant's liability, then the plaintiff is prohibited from 
accumulating recoveries. In a situation where the liabilities of the wrongdoers are imposed by law (as 
opposed to having been assumed by contract), the generally accepted rule is that courts look to the 
underlying policy of the rules that impose liability to determine whether it would be consistent with 
that underlying policy to allow the plaintiff to accumulate recoveries.87 For example, if both 
wrongdoers are liable in tort, then given that the primary purpose of imposing tort liabilities is to 
compensate tort victims for harm suffered, and not to make them better off than they were before the 
tort was committed, accumulation of recoveries is forbidden. 
Where two wrongdoers cause separate injuries to the same plaintiff, there is no reason why the 
plaintiff should not recover from both of them. In this situation the policy of preventing double 
recovery does not apply. However, where the wrongdoers cause a single indivisible injury, double 
recovery is not permitted.88 A situation given in Goff & Jones as illustration of the point that the 
"policies" inquiry can vary according to the circumstances of the case is where a purchaser is induced 
to enter into a contract of sale by a misrepresentation by a third party. The question as to whether the 
purchaser can accumulate recoveries from the vendor and the third party depends on whether the 
damages payable by the third party are assessed net of the damages the vendor is liable for.89 The 
authors of Goff & Jones suggest that a useful inquiry at this point can be the application of the mutual 
discharge test.90   
It would seem therefore that there is a degree of overlap between the inquiry as to whether the 
claimant's payment has discharged the defendant's liability and that as to whether the plaintiff can 
accumulate recoveries. The answer to both those inquiries, which should be regarded as separate 
questions, requires consideration of all of the following: the nature of the liabilities of each of the 
  
87  At [20.53]; and Mitchell, above n 64, at [7.14]. 
88  Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson, above n 2, at [20.56]. 
89  At [20.56].  
90  But they note, as illustrated by the Howkins decision, the fact that there is no mutual discharge does not 
necessarily lead to a conclusion that the plaintiff is permitted to accumulate recoveries: at [20.58]–[20.61]. A 
similar analysis is provided in Mitchell, above n 64, at [7.14]–[7.26].  
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claimant and the defendant, the policies underlying those liabilities, the circumstances of the case and 
rules around calculation of damages. 
The requirement that the plaintiff be able to recover in full from either is a reference to the system 
of joint and several liability that English law operates, as opposed to a system of proportionate 
liability.91 
The final limb of the Goff & Jones approach requires that it is appropriate that some or all of the 
burden of liability should be borne by the defendant. The authors of Goff & Jones state (agreeing with 
Equity Doctrines and Remedies on this point) that where there is no contractual allocation of 
responsibility between the claimant and the defendant, the courts have adopted a default rule of equal 
apportionment.92 However, the authors of Goff & Jones state that the courts have departed from this 
rule if the causative potency of the parties' actions was unequal,93 or the moral blameworthiness of 
the parties was unequal,94 or one of the obligors gains a larger benefit than the other from the 
transactions that give rise to the liabilities.95  
As explained earlier, in Hotchin, the Chief Justice indicated her support for the law to move in the 
direction preferred by Kirby J, saying, "[c]ontribution is an equitable remedy to right what would 
otherwise be an injustice, but only to that extent."96 In Hotchin the Court reserved to itself a broad 
equitable discretion to determine the amount of contribution awarded, which is very similar to the 
Goff & Jones approach.97 One might argue that the Goff & Jones approach is more principled than 
the Chief Justice's approach as it starts from a presumption of equal apportionment and only departs 
from that by reference to defined circumstances identified in the cases. 
In summary, the approach now favoured by the New Zealand Supreme Court focuses on mutual 
discharge of liability. If the answer to that inquiry is yes, then it often follows that the plaintiff could 
not accumulate recoveries. Both approaches require an assessment of the proper share of the burden 
  
91  In those jurisdictions where proportionate liability systems operate (such as Australia) the relevant legislation 
will have to be considered and will impact on whether this criteria is satisfied. 
92  Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson, above n 2, at [20.82]. 
93  At [20.92]–[20.95] (where case examples are given).  
94  At [20.96]–[20.98] (where case examples are given). 
95  At [20.99]–[20.100] (where case examples are given). 
96  Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, above n 7, at [157].  
97  Under an unjust enrichment analysis, the defendant would also be able to raise defences to the claim. It might 
be raised as a defence for example that in a situation (such as Hotchin) where the claimant settled then sought 
contribution to the settlement amount paid, the claimant should not have settled for that amount. See Mitchell, 
Mitchell and Watterson, above n 2, at [20.18]. 
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to be borne by the defendant. The unjust enrichment approach as proposed in Goff & Jones appears 
to reserve to the court a broadly similar discretion around the amount of the award ultimately made. 
D  Debate over the "Unjust" Factor 
An essential element in the unjust enrichment analysis of contribution is the presence of the unjust 
factor, in other words the reason why it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit. There 
is debate amongst the unjust enrichment writers about the factor that makes retention of the 
enrichment unjust, in relation to a claim for contribution. In any unjust enrichment claim, the "unjust" 
factor is not determined based on notions of what is fair and reasonable in that situation but by 
reference to established factors.98 The unjust factor that Edelman and Bant in Unjust Enrichment 
identify in relation to contribution claims is "powerlessness".99 The obligor who was pursued by the 
plaintiff was powerless in relation to the fact proceedings were brought against it and not the other 
obligor. That makes the retention of the enrichment by the defendant unjust.  
Other writers have identified the unjust factor in claims for contribution as policy (Mitchell)100 
and compulsion (Virgo).101 Mitchell acknowledges that the authors of Goff & Jones (5th ed) point to 
the compulsory nature of the claimant's payment to the plaintiff to explain why it is unjust for the 
defendant to enjoy the benefit it has gained at the claimant's expense.102 But Mitchell points out that 
this ground for recovery is difficult to sustain when considering cases where the claimant has freely 
undertaken legal liability to the plaintiff.103 Mitchell proposes that there is a better, policy-based, 
explanation. Where a claimant and a defendant are both legally liable to a plaintiff, and the plaintiff 
is forbidden to accumulate recoveries by enforcing rights against both of them, the law recognises 
two conflicting objectives. First, the law aims to make the defendant bear an appropriate share of the 
burden of paying the plaintiff. On the other hand, the law aims to give the plaintiff the fullest possible 
means of recovering what is due to him or her. To achieve these objectives the law gives the plaintiff 
the right to recover from either in full. If the plaintiff then chooses to recover from the claimant, the 
law gives the claimant a right to recover an appropriate contribution from the defendant to ensure that 
equity as between the claimant and the defendant is not defeated by the choice of the plaintiff as to 
which obligor to pursue. However, Edelman and Bant would reject a policy-based explanation, 
  
98  Edelman and Bant, above n 6, at 118–119. 
99  At 293–295. 
100  Mitchell, above n 64, at [3.28]–[3.29]. 
101  Virgo, above n 5, at 246.  
102  Mitchell, above n 64, at [3.24].  
103  At [3.27].  
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maintaining the unjust factor must be related to some matter that makes the claimant's intention to 
benefit the defendant, imperfect.104  
The policy argument finds support in the Chief Justice's decision in Hotchin.105 However if the 
claim by Mr Hotchin had been approached using an unjust enrichment analysis, it would also have 
been possible to point to powerlessness on his part. More generally, he had no intention to benefit the 
defendant trustee by paying the regulator in settlement of the claim.   
IX  AN UNJUST ENRICHMENT ANALYSIS HAS BEEN ADOPTED 
IN SUBROGATION CLAIMS 
As explained above, the rules on discharge are not straightforward. In some situations, in 
particular involving payments by indemnity insurers, payment by the insurer to the insured does not 
discharge the liability of the third party that caused the loss. Instead, the indemnity insurer has a right 
to be subrogated to the claims of the insured.106  
In Caledonia North Sea Ltd v British Telecommunications plc, Lord Hoffmann said that there are 
different ways of giving effect to the principle that a person who has more than one claim to indemnity 
is not entitled to be paid more than once.107 In Lord Hoffmann's view, subrogation would generally 
be adopted as the remedy where the liability of the person who paid is secondary to the liability of the 
other party. The other solution would be to say that the liability of the other party has been discharged 
and to allow a claim for contribution. This is an oversimplification of the relationship between 
contribution and subrogation, and has been doubted.108 Nevertheless, there is clearly a relationship 
between contribution and subrogation and the courts' approach to the unjust enrichment analysis in a 
subrogation context is therefore relevant. 
In Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd, the High Court of Australia recently said, "[s]ubrogation may 
be seen as preventing the unjust enrichment of the principal debtor who otherwise might escape 
carriage of ultimate liability".109 However, the Court also stated that "unjust enrichment was not a 
principle supplying a sufficient premise for direct application in a particular case".110  These 
statements demonstrate how the term "unjust enrichment" is capable of different meanings. In a 
general sense, the fact one party has been unjustly enriched has on occasion been seen as part of the 
  
104  Edelman and Bant, above n 6, at 127–130 and 138–139. 
105  Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, above n 7, at [140] and [152].  
106  Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson, above n 2, at [21.01]–[21.06]. 
107  Caledonia North Sea Ltd v British Telecommunications plc [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 553 (HL). 
108  Mitchell, above n 64, at [9.14].  
109  Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd, above n 68, at [88]. 
110  At [85]. 
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justification for equitable relief (as in Cockburn and Lavin).111 However, it is not regarded in Australia 
as a stand alone cause of action nor is it recognised as the appropriate analysis to apply to determine 
if relief by way of subrogation is to be granted. In Bofinger the High Court has made it clear that in 
Australia, unjust enrichment is not the basis of subrogation. Rather subrogation is based on principles 
of equity and is applied in circumstances where it would be unconscionable not to grant relief.112 
The English courts take a different approach. In the recent United Kingdom Supreme Court 
decision of Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd, the Court approached the subrogation inquiry using 
an unjust enrichment analysis (thereby acknowledging subrogation as part of the law of unjust 
enrichment).113 Here, the bank claimed it was entitled to be subrogated to an unpaid vendor's lien on 
a property (P1) by reason of having agreed to allow part of the proceeds of a sale of another property 
(P2), which was subject to legal charges in favour of the bank, to be used to purchase P1, on condition 
that the bank's debts were then to be secured by a charge over P1. Lord Clarke said simply:114  
It appears to me that this is a case of unjust enrichment … it is now well established that the court must 
ask itself four questions when faced with a claim for unjust enrichment. They are these: (1) Has the 
defendant been enriched? (2) Was the enrichment at the claimant's expense? (3) Was the enrichment 
unjust? (4) Are there any defences available to the defendant? 
In New Zealand, a recent High Court decision adopted the English approach. In Intext Coatings 
Ltd (in liq) v Deo, the High Court indicated a clear preference for the English approach, applying an 
unjust enrichment analysis to the issue of whether a claim for subrogation could succeed in a situation 
where money used in breach of a fiduciary duty was used to discharge a secured debt.115 After 
considering the case law and commentaries on the topic, Fitzgerald J said:116 
What is required, however, is close consideration of whether the defendant has been enriched at the 
plaintiff's expense, and if so, whether that is unjust. And that is not to be considered in a moral or 
overarching "fairness" sense. Rather, a principled approach must be taken. 
The approach to subrogation claims in England and New Zealand indicates a willingness to use 
the unjust enrichment approach to assess whether there is the basis for a claim, where the underlying 
wrong the court is addressing is that the defendant has been unjustly enriched at the claimant's 
expense. This is how a claim for contribution might also be approached. 
  
111  Cockburn & Ors v GIO Finance Ltd (No 2), above n 82, at [37]; and Lavin v Toppi, above n 78, at [41]. 
112  Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd, above n 68, at [85]–[98].  
113  Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd [2015] UKSC 66, [2016] AC 176.  
114  At [18]. See J Palmer "Restitution" [2016] NZ L Rev 435, for a criticism of this decision. 
115  Intext Coatings Ltd (in liq) v Deo [2016] NZHC 2754, [2017] NZAR 47 at [143]–[146]. 
116  At [143]. 
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X  IS THERE ANY REASON WHY EQUITABLE CONTRIBUTION 
SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE CONSIDERED AS 
EXCLUSIVELY PART OF THE LAW OF EQUITY? 
Notwithstanding the similarities in the approach taken by the Court in Hotchin and that proposed 
by the unjust enrichment writers, one might suggest that equitable contribution should continue to be 
considered part of the law of equity alone, because of the focus of the equitable doctrine on assessment 
of the equities of the individual situation (or put simply, the fairness of requiring contribution be 
ordered).  
The doctrine of equitable contribution is grounded in natural justice. Were equity not to intervene, 
then it would remain within the power of the creditor to act as to cause one debtor to be relieved of a 
responsibility shared with another.117 Equity follows the law in the sense that it does not seek to direct 
the manner of exercise of the rights of the creditor, but equity does make an adjustment between the 
debtors. Thus, equity does not interfere with the action of the creditor but seeks to ensure the sharing 
of the burden between those subjected to it.118 
Unjust enrichment on the other hand focuses on the fact of enrichment at the plaintiff's expense, 
where there is a recognised unjust factor. That factor may or may not give rise to an injustice on the 
facts of the individual case; that is not the purpose of the "unjust" factor. Both doctrines are concerned 
with addressing the fact that the defendant has gained something at the plaintiff's expense. However, 
equitable contribution focuses on the inequity that results from the fact that the creditor has chosen to 
pursue one obligor and not the other, in that particular case.  
This difference means that it may be inappropriate to approach a claim for equitable contribution 
as a claim in unjust enrichment because of the focus in the equitable contribution cases on the 
injustice. The Australian courts have adopted a relatively strict framework for assessment of when it 
will be inequitable to allow retention of the benefit in the equitable contribution cases. The Australian 
High Court in both Friend v Brooker and Burke required that for the liabilities to be coordinate they 
had to be of comparable culpability and comparable causal significance.119 This was how the Court 
assessed whether the liabilities are of the "same nature". Importantly, in all cases the focus is on the 
injustice of allowing the burden to fall where it lies if no contribution was allowed. The equitable 
doctrine ensures that one obligor does not end up carrying a "disproportionate share of the burden".120 
Is there a risk that adopting an unjust enrichment approach would result in a loss of flexibility in the 
court's assessment of whether contribution should be ordered? It is relevant in this context to note that 
  
117  Randall, above n 11, at §493. 
118  Friend v Brooker [2009] HCA 21, (2009) 239 CLR 129 at [38]. 
119  Friend v Brooker, above n 118. 
120  Lavin v Toppi, above n 78, at [32]. 
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the approach the Supreme Court has adopted in Hotchin has been to reinforce the flexibility of the 
equitable remedy. Subject to meeting the threshold test of mutual discharge, under the Hotchin 
approach the court is at liberty to take all circumstances into account when determining the 
appropriate amount of contribution (if any).121  
The requirement in New Zealand for comparable culpability and comparable causal significance 
has been removed following the Hotchin decision. It is suggested that the unjust enrichment analysis 
as proposed in Goff & Jones is sufficiently flexible to accommodate assessment of the equitable 
considerations, given the latitude around determining the ultimate burden properly to be borne by the 
defendant. 
XI  CONCLUSION 
Currently the New Zealand courts approach a claim for contribution as a claim in equity. Prior to 
the decision in Hotchin, the courts have required that there be a "common burden" before a claim for 
equitable contribution will succeed, which requires a degree of coordination between the liabilities.  
The New Zealand Supreme Court in Hotchin has moved away from the requirement of a common 
burden, or at least has indicated that the test for a common burden in New Zealand is now mutual 
discharge. Mutual discharge has also been adopted as the test for whether the damage is "the same" 
by a line of English cases in the context of claims under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act (UK), 
but this approach has been rejected by the House of Lords. The Australian courts continue to require 
a finding of common burden, often described as "coordinate liabilities", and require comparable levels 
of culpability and causative effect. 
Following Hotchin, the law in New Zealand is that all which is required to establish that the 
liabilities are sufficiently coordinate such that a claim for contribution is established, is that the 
plaintiff could pursue either the claimant or the defendant for its loss and either would be liable for it, 
in whole or in part. This is based on the underlying rationale that payment by either the claimant or 
the defendant would discharge the liability of the other, in whole or in part. If that test is satisfied, the 
court then has a broad discretion to determine the amount of contribution to be awarded, if any. At 
that stage issues of relative causation and culpability become relevant. There is, however, no 
requirement for comparable levels of culpability or causative effect. 
There is a significant overlap between this approach and the approach taken to the law of 
contribution by the authors of Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment. The conditions identified 
in Goff & Jones for a successful claim applying an unjust enrichment analysis can be met in the 
context of a claim for contribution, under the approach now adopted by the Supreme Court. The 
  
121  The breadth of the considerations relevant at this stage is broad. For example, Glazebrook J suggested that 
the statements made by Mr Hotchin in relation to the settlement with the Financial Markets Authority would 
be relevant to the contribution claim: Hotchin v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, above n 7, at [98].  
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"unjust" factor in the three-fold approach of enrichment, at the expense of the claimant, that is unjust, 
could be described as powerlessness, compulsion or (arguably) policy.  
There is judicial precedent for applying an unjust enrichment analysis to establish a claim, in 
relation to the law of subrogation. The New Zealand courts have indicated a willingness to follow the 
English courts' approach of treating a claim for subrogation as a claim based on unjust enrichment. It 
would be possible for a future New Zealand court to take the same approach to a claim for 
contribution.   
